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DOMA’S GHOST AND COPYRIGHT 
REVERSIONARY INTERESTS† 
Brad A. Greenberg 
ABSTRACT—When the Supreme Court struck down part of the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in United States v. Windsor, it created 
an unexpected conflict of law in an unrelated statute. The Copyright Act 
mandates statutory heirs for reversionary interests, and whether an author 
leaves a surviving spouse is based on “the law of the author’s domicile at 
the time of his or her death.” Federal law now forbids limiting marital 
recognition, and the benefits therefrom, to heterosexual couples, but the 
Windsor Court left in place the DOMA provision that permits states to 
refuse to recognize marriages entered into in another state. That means an 
author could bequeath her copyrights to her widow free of federal estate 
taxes but, if the author dies in a state that does not recognize her same-sex 
marriage, the reversionary interests would skip the widow and go solely to 
the author’s children. This conflict of law undermines Congress’s goal of 
encouraging the creation of expressive works by promising rewards to an 
author’s widow and children. To resolve the conflict, this Essay proffers 
amending the Copyright Act to base statutory heirs on the law of the state 
of the marriage’s celebration. 
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Copyright law typically is not thought of as intertwined with family 
law.1 Still, a major theoretical underpinning of copyright’s incentive system 
is that an author is motivated not only by the financial reward she hopes to 
reap during her life, but also by whatever her family might reap long after 
her death.2 And the Supreme Court’s highly anticipated decision in United 
States v. Windsor3 complicates this family-incentive theory by undermining 
Congress’s belief that an author would want her widow to inherit her rights. 
Instead, it creates a situation in which federal law and state law too often 
will recognize different heirs. 
In Windsor, the Supreme Court held that Section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), which denied federal benefits to same-sex 
spouses,4 raised federalism concerns and violated “due process and equal 
protection principles.”5 The Obama Administration responded two days 
later by making federal employee benefits available to “all legally married 
same-sex spouses.”6 But the availability of gay marriage within each state, 
and the state benefits derived therefrom, did not change. As of this writing, 
about a third of states allow same-sex couples to marry.7 These 
circumstances put the federal Copyright Act’s use of state law in 
determining reversionary interests on a collision course with its goal of 
offering clarity as to author incentives and copyright ownership. 
 
1 Indeed, copyright law today is a wholly federal field, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012), and family law 
historically has been “a virtually exclusive province of the States.” Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 
S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)). 
2 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15 (2003). 
3 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
4 Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)). 
5 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691, 2693. 
6 Memorandum from Elaine Kaplan, Acting Dir., U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., to Heads of Exec. 
Dep’ts & Agencies (June 28, 2013), available at http://www.chcoc.gov/transmittals/Transmittal
Details.aspx?TransmittalID=5700. 
7 Dana Davidsen, Illinois Becomes 16th State to Allow Same-Sex Marriage, CNN (Nov. 20, 2013, 
6:47 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/11/20/illinois-becomes-16th-state-to-allow-same-
sex-marriage/; Chris Kirk, A New State Joins the Gay-Marriage Map, SLATE (Nov. 15, 2013, 2:53 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/map_of_the_week/2013/11/which_states_allow_gay
_marriage_mapped.html. 
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Though not as immediately apparent as changes to healthcare benefits 
or tax-filing status, Windsor’s implications for copyright law are 
significant. Invalidating Section 3 of DOMA means that a same-sex widow 
could inherit her author wife’s copyrights free of federal estate taxes. 
However, copyright law also dictates statutory heirs on reversionary 
interests—the renewal right, previously, and the termination right8—and 
here a choice of law conflict frequently will arise. The 1976 Copyright Act 
defines a widow(er) as “the author’s surviving spouse under the law of the 
author’s domicile at the time of his or her death.”9 Because the Windsor 
Court left in place Section 2 of DOMA, which permits states to refuse to 
recognize a same-sex marriage celebrated in another state,10 the 
reversionary interests could skip a same-sex widow(er) and go entirely to 
the children. Beyond being theoretically incongruous, this disparity 
undermines author incentives and increases copyright transaction costs. 
And, with 2013 being the first year in which a termination right could be 
exercised for works created under the 1976 Copyright Act,11 courts soon 
will confront this choice of law problem. 
This Essay analyzes Windsor’s overlooked copyright implications and 
argues that Congress should amend the Copyright Act to rely on the law of 
the state of the marriage’s celebration. Doing so would add some 
consistency to copyright law’s family-incentive theory. It also would 
remove inefficient grants of copyright ownership that fail to motivate 
authorship because the disposition is contrary to the author’s desires. 
Further, such congressional action would guard against ownership 
uncertainty that can frustrate copyright policy goals by increasing 
deadweight loss. 
I. COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES AND THE FAMILY 
Copyright law incorporates what could be considered a traditional 
notion of the family. It uses state laws to dictate who belongs in an author’s 
family and limits testamentary freedom accordingly. An author’s 
 
8 Works created before 1978 were eligible for an initial term and a renewal term; if the renewal 
owner failed to exercise that right, the work would fall into the public domain. See Stewart v. Abend, 
495 U.S. 207, 217–19 (1990). Termination is an inalienable right that, regardless of any agreement to 
the contrary, entitles the author or her statutory heir to take back the copyright after a fixed time of 
roughly thirty-five years for works created on or after January 1, 1978, and fifty-six years for works 
created before. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(3)–(5), 304(c) (2012); see also Marvel Characters, Inc. v. 
Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 292 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding “that an agreement made subsequent to a work’s 
creation which retroactively deems it a ‘work for hire’ constitutes an ‘agreement to the contrary’ under 
§ 304(c)(5)” and thus is ineffective). 
9 § 101. 
10 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). 
11 For most copyright transfers executed on or after January 1, 1978, the earliest vesting 
termination rights could be effected during a five-year window beginning January 1, 2013. See 17 
U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012). 
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widow(er)—as recognized by the state of the author’s death—is a statutory 
heir, in addition to the author’s children, whether offspring or legally 
adopted.12 Stepchildren, grandchildren, and “descendants beyond the first 
degree” are not statutory heirs for the renewal right,13 but grandchildren are 
for the termination right.14 If the author dies during the first copyright term 
for works registered prior to January 1, 1978, the copyright may be 
renewed by the widow(er) or the children. For works created on or after 
January 1, 1978, however, the author’s termination right automatically 
descends to the widow(er) and the children, each taking a one-half interest; 
a majority—i.e., the widow(er) and at least one child—must agree to 
exercise a termination right. The automatic descent of reversionary 
interests to statutory heirs recognizes Congress’s assumption that an author 
will have greater incentives to create if she knows that her immediate 
family might profit from her works long after she is gone.15 
Both the renewal and the termination rights provide the author with 
another bite at the apple. Specifically, the termination right allows the 
author to terminate any assignment (except when a “work for hire”), 
including that of the renewal. In adding legislation on the termination right, 
Congress sought to protect vulnerable authors from being forced into ill-
advised and unremunerative transfers.16 Termination gives an author, or her 
family after her death, the chance to recapture a work and possibly 
capitalize on its commercial success. 
Renewal and termination rights are copyright incentives that fuel “the 
engine of free expression.”17 Incentives need not be monetary—e.g., 
reputational or political rewards—but money talks, and copyright’s 
incentive system generally is built upon financial rewards. Because the 
Constitution authorizes Congress to provide these incentives “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”18 creating private wealth for the 
 
12 § 101. Even within the class of statutory heirs, Congress gave authors no testamentary freedom. 
A spouse can only be divested by divorce, and there is no manner by which to divest children. 
13 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 7:17 (2013). Under the 1909 Act, state law also 
could exclude illegitimate children. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 582 (1956). 
14 §§ 203(a)(2)(A), 304(c)(2)(A). 
15 This assumes that authors are indeed motivated by potential downstream rewards to family; 
challenging that belief is beyond the scope of this Essay. But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255 
(2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 
219, 227 (arguing that spouses and children have been used as “props” to advance copyright industry 
interests). 
16 For a discussion of the legislative history on termination and an example of what Congress was 
guarding against, see Brad A. Greenberg, Comment, More than Just a Formality: Instant Authorship 
and Copyright’s Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1028, 1060–61 (2012). 
17 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Counterintuitively, Science refers to copyrightable original works 
of authorship and Arts refers to patentable inventions. 
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author is an ancillary benefit of advancing the public interest.19 Thus, the 
efficiency of copyright allocations increases as incentives are better tailored 
to maximize author production. But the marital-status conflict will lead to 
inefficiencies in awarding termination rights.20 
II. CONFLICT OF LAWS AND COPYRIGHT COSTS 
No states permitted same-sex marriage when the 1976 Copyright Act 
was enacted. DOMA, passed in 1996, ensured that even as states began 
permitting same-sex marriage approximately ten years ago, there remained 
a uniform metric for determining a copyright owner’s statutory widow(er). 
DOMA gave the federal government exclusive authority to define marriage 
in relation to federal benefits, including copyrights,21 and effectively 
superseded the Copyright Act’s reliance on state law. While it is unclear 
why Congress anchored the Copyright Act’s determination on “the law of 
the author’s domicile at the time of his or her death,”22 it is clear that, under 
DOMA’s blanket rule, the state of reference did not matter.23 
In Windsor’s wake, however, the Copyright Act’s choice of state law 
creates a conflict in which reversionary interests might not be devised per 
Congress’s intent for an author who dies in a state that does not recognize 
same-sex marriages lawfully entered into in another state. Yet because 
termination rights are offered as author incentives, it makes little sense that 
the law would devise these rights inconsistent with an author’s desires. 
Accordingly, the new conflict between state and federal law may remove 
from a gay or lesbian author an incentive that is available to straight 
authors. Worse, it may result in a reduction of incentives for a gay or 
lesbian author who would be discouraged to create if, for instance, she is 
estranged from her children and would not want them to receive the entire 
termination right.24 
 
19 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (quoting 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)); Greenberg, supra note 16, at 1065 
(also referencing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken). 
20 The same would be true for renewal rights if any had yet to vest. However, because renewal 
rights vest in the final year of the initial copyright term, which under the 1976 Act could be no later 
than 2005, there remain no renewal rights to devise. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2012). 
21 And, to be sure, the Copyright Act is not the only federal law with a poorly designed choice of 
state law provision. See generally William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal 
Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012) (proposing designs for a federal choice of law system). 
22 § 101. The legislative history does not evince a clear reason, other than “to avoid problems and 
uncertainties” that arose under the 1909 Act’s renewal provision. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 125 (1976). 
It is unsurprising, though, considering that the domicile of death generally governs wills and estates. 
See, e.g., EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 12:1 (2d ed. 2013). 
23 At least, not in regard to an inconsistent recognition of a same-sex spouse. Choice of state law 
did create consistency between federal law and that of the domicile at death on other differences among 
states, including consanguinity and age restrictions. 
24 Whether that poses a different equal protection question will not be answered here. 
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Additionally, employing the law of the author’s domicile at death 
increases uncertainty about who owns the reversionary interests. This, in 
turn, increases licensing transaction costs. Imagine an author who marries 
her wife in Massachusetts and, while living in Boston, writes the next Great 
American Novel. She and her wife adopt two boys, whom they raise in 
Florida, which, at the time of her death twenty years later, neither permits 
nor recognizes same-sex marriage. This scenario adds several costs to a 
licensee or potential licensee. First, a publisher who buys the book’s rights 
must identify the author’s domicile at the time of death and perform some 
cursory legal research to determine whether the same-sex widow and 
children must jointly file the termination notice or whether the children 
could do it alone. Second, a potential licensee of the publisher’s book rights 
could not simply look at a publicly available copyright registration to 
deduce who could terminate the author’s previous assignment to the 
publisher and thus prevent future exploitation absent a new license. And, 
third, termination is more likely when the right goes solely to the children 
and not also to the same-sex spouse, who may disagree with the children 
about terminating the assignment or license. 
By contravening an author’s desires and increasing transaction costs, 
the Copyright Act’s choice of state law undermines the copyright-incentive 
system and adds to its deadweight loss. But this need not be. Congress can 
amend the Copyright Act to sharpen incentives and remove the additional 
costs. 
III. A SIMPLE SOLUTION? 
Congress cannot remedy this incoherence by removing the choice of 
state law from the Copyright Act and defaulting to a uniform federal 
definition of an author’s spouse.25 If Congress amended the Copyright Act 
to exclude a same-sex widow from taking a reversionary interest, the 
amendment would appear to violate equal protection principles for the 
same reasons Section 3 of DOMA did; if the law defined spouses as 
members of either the same or opposite sex, the law would raise the 
federalism concerns noted in Windsor. But Congress does have two viable 
alternatives.26 
The first is to do away with the Copyright Act’s restraint on 
testamentary freedom. Copyright law’s designation of statutory heirs is 
 
25 This is unlike Congress’s ability, as realized in the 1976 Act, to override state laws excluding 
illegitimate children from the statutory heir class. 
26 Absent congressional action, Will Baude also suggests a third approach to the general choice of 
law problem: federal courts could treat a couple as married if their home state does. Baude, supra note 
21, at 1418–23. Though sensible, this approach would not address the copyright-specific issues raised in 
this Essay. 
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atypical among the property and quasi-property fields.27 It has the effect of 
“estate-bumping,”28 which means that it can produce property dispositions 
contrary to an author’s intent, even when the author executed a will. And, 
as discussed above, forcing an author’s estate to devise the reversionary 
interests can remove or even reduce author incentives to create. Moreover, 
the testamentary limitations only apply to the reversionary interests, 
making possible a scenario in which an author wills her copyrights to a 
specific person but is forced to leave to her statutory heirs a reversionary 
right to divest her will’s beneficiary later. Removing these limitations 
would improve the efficiency of copyright law’s incentive system and 
would add some coherence to the law’s theory of the family. 
Giving authors such testamentary freedom would, however, resurrect 
an old problem. Recall Congress’s rationale for adding the termination 
right in the first place. Before the 1976 Act, publishers frequently forced 
authors to assign both the initial copyright term and the renewal right, 
effectively negating any chance for the author or her family to take a 
second bite. To spare termination the same fate, the 1976 Act prohibits an 
author from waiving, assigning, or otherwise disclaiming a termination 
right.29 It is an inalienable right. If Congress removed statutory heirs from 
the Copyright Act and gave authors full testamentary freedom over their 
copyright estates, it would not simply be foreseeable that publishers, 
studios, record labels, and other content distributors would force all but the 
most successful authors to assign termination rights; it would be 
inevitable.30 
The other option is to craft a better choice of law provision. This could 
be done numerous ways. I focus here on two. 
One approach would be to choose the law of the author’s domicile at 
the time the work is created. Rather than focusing on where the author 
resided when she died, the law could look to where the work came to life. 
This would provide authors with a clearer understanding of their incentives 
to create and would reduce uncertainty of ownership. The ex ante notice to 
 
27 Copyright law’s forced heirship is similar to state laws concerning an omitted spouse or child, 
except that the statutory heirs cannot be contravened by explicit authorial intent. The inflexible nature 
of termination’s descent is a consequence of authors asking for such a failsafe to prevent publishers 
from demanding assignment of the new termination right. 
28 Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 109, 
111 (2006). 
29 See supra notes 8, 16 and accompanying text. 
30 Though alienability of property interests generally has economic benefits, the experience of the 
1909 Act’s assignable renewal rights suggests copyright reversionary interests are different. See, e.g., 
H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESSION, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 53 (Comm. Print 
1961). “[P]ermitting assignments of contingent interests made that benefit largely illusory.” Lydia 
Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the “Inalienable” Right to Terminate, 
62 FLA. L. REV. 1329, 1344 (2010). 
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authors would serve copyright law’s constitutional purpose of promoting 
cultural advancement while limiting attendant restrictions on others’ 
speech. It also would come without expense to the law’s internal author 
protections in the form of the termination right, which can be thought of 
separately as preserving an incentive. Further, using the domicile of 
authorship would enable potential licensees to avoid thirty-five years of 
wondering where the author will die. Instead, they would know 
immediately whether copyright reversionary interests would pass to the 
children only or also to a same-sex widow. 
But this would not remove the conflict between federal and state laws 
in many situations.31 Worse, it could actually increase conflicts. Choosing 
the state of authorship would freeze in time an author’s marital status—
possibly long before death and many years before the author marries—and, 
to avoid raising equal protection concerns, it would have to apply equally 
to opposite-sex marriages. Such an approach also would inject a new 
challenge: determining when the work was created. For works completed in 
more than one sitting, each component part authored in a different state 
could substantially cloud certainty as to which state’s laws would apply. 
Instead, the approach that appears best tailored to promoting copyright 
policy goals is to choose the law of the state in which the marriage was 
celebrated. If the state of celebration recognizes the author as lawfully 
married, the Copyright Act would, too. First, this would erase most, if not 
all, conflicts by directing the Copyright Act to choose a state law that 
matches the Obama Administration’s marital recognition without taking 
from states the power to determine whether two individuals are married. 
Second, it would give an author clarity regarding whether a same-sex 
spouse will receive not only federal-estate-tax-free copyrights, if so 
bequeathed, but also the copyright reversionary interests. That, in turn, 
would preserve an incentive that Congress intended authors to have and, at 
the least, give copyright law a more consistent family-incentive theory. 
Finally, choosing the state of celebration would accomplish these benefits 
without jeopardizing author protections. 
To be sure, such a choice of law could increase transaction costs by 
making it even more difficult to determine whether an author was 
married.32 It also could result in new conflicts if the federal government 
moved away from the Obama Administration’s “legally married” criteria 
for federal benefits.33 However, those costs and conflicts are significantly 
 
31 Indeed, there are authors working outside of California and New York. 
32 Such questions—e.g., What is a lawful marriage?—are numerous. See Baude, supra note 21, at 
1382–87. 
33 An additional challenge would be federalizing a public policy exception for foreign marriages 
that both are contrary to law and exceptionally offensive to common decency. State courts already 
utilize such an exception to refuse to recognize polygamous marriages or those between extremely 
closely related individuals. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
333–36 (6th ed. 2010). 
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fewer than those created by choosing the law of the author’s domicile at 
death. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor removed 
any consistency from the federal Copyright Act’s choice of state law in 
determining reversionary interests. Conflicts too often will arise between 
federal law, which cannot force a same-sex widow to pay estate taxes on 
her author wife’s copyrights, and the laws of states that refuse to recognize 
a lawful same-sex marriage, which would bar the same-sex widow from 
receiving termination rights under the federal Copyright Act. These 
conflicts, in turn, will reduce author incentives and increase uncertainty of 
ownership. But Congress can remedy this conflict by choosing the law of 
the state in which the author’s marriage was celebrated, instead of looking 
to the state of the author’s death or where the work was authored. 
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